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HENRY W. EDGERTON
If a driver employed by a milk corporation sells watered milk
in violation of a statute, either on his own initiative or on the
order of the manager, the board of directors or the stockholders,
may the corporation be convicted? If the manager of a coal
corporation, either on his own initiative or on the order of the
board of directors or the stockholders, combines with other con-
cerns in unlawful restraint of trade, may the corporation be
convicted? If guards in the pay of a mining corporation, either
on their own initiative or on the order of the manager, the board
of directors or the stockholders, direct a murderous gun-fire at a
village in which striking employees live, in order to suppress
the strike, may the corporation be convicted of murder?
It is submitted that the corporation should be criminally re-
sponsible in all the cases put. A corporation should be consid-
ered capable of any crime, and guilty of any crime if the human
persons who commit the crime act in the course of their em-
ployment so as to make the corporation responsible in tort. The
courts, if they have not fully reached this position, are approach-
ing it. In the past 75 years they have progressed from very
narrow views to or toward very broad views of corporate crim-
inal responsibility. I But it is not yet clear that corporations
can commit all crimes; on the contrary, it is constantly as-
sumed that they cannot; and it is not at all clear what human
action is necessary to the commission of corporate crime.
THE AUTHORITIES
It used to be laid down that a corporation could not commit
crime.2 Later, it was held that, though it might be criminally
responsible for non-feasance, such as failure to repair roads or
bridges,3 it could not be for misfeasance; " though an exception
was made of nuisance.0 But soon after the middle of the last
'Two law review articles published in recent years have agreed in op-
posing the modern tendency toward broad responsibility. Canfield, Cor-
porate Responsibility for Crime (1914) 14 CoL. L. Ra-. 409; Francis, Crim-
inal Responsibility of the Corporation (1924) 18 ILL. L. REV. 305.
2 Anonymous, 12 Mod. 559 (K. B. 1701) (Holt, C. J.) ; 1 Br. Co~ra. *470,
*477.
3 Note (1912) 2 Brit. R. C. 231, at 232.
4 State v. Ohio R. R., 23 Ind. 362 (1864) ; State v. Great Worlis Co., 20
Ale. 41 (1841); Delaware Canal Co. v. Commonwealth, 00 Pa. St. OG7
(1869).
5 State v. Morris R. R., 23 N. J. L. 360 (1852); Delaware Canal Co. v.
Commonwealth, supra note 4.
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century, the general notion that criminal misfeasance by a corpo-
ration is impossible practically disappeared. It has long been
settled in most jurisdictions that corporations are capable of
committing crimes in which the mental element is inconspicuous,
or, as it is sometimes expressed, "the criminal intent is imma-
terial"; such as dealing in adulterated articles in violation of a
statute.8 An intent to do the act which is prohibited may be at-
tributed to a corporation. 7
But several vestiges of the old tradition survive. First, if
the crime involves "mens rea," in the sense that the mental ele-
ment in the crime is conspicuous, the early Victorian tradition
that a corporation cannot commit it 8 has persisted, in some
courts, into modern times., As Judge Hough has pointed out,
this proposition regarding "mens rea" has usually been laid
down by way of dictum; 10 and most courts have advanced to the
position that a corporation may be guilty of various forms of
"mens rea." 11
6 Commonwealth v. Graustein & Co., 209 Mass. 38, 95 N. E. 97 (1911);
Pearks, Gunston & Tee, Ltd. v. Ward [1902] 2 K. B. 1.
7 United States v. John Kelso Co., 86 Fed. 304 (N. D. Calif. 1898).
s State v. Morris R. R., supra note 5, at 370; Commonwealth v. Now
Bedford Bridge, 2 Gray, 339, 345 (Mass. 1854).
9 State v. Western N. C. R. R., 95 N. C. 602, 610 (1886) ; Commonwealth
v. Punxsutawney St. Ry., 24 Pa. Co. Ct. 25 (1899); Regina v. Gt. West.
Laundry Co., 13 Man. 66 (1900); Pearks, Gunston & Tee, Ltd. v. Ward,
supra note 6, at 11.
10 United States v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 Fed. 823, 836 (C. C. S.
D. N. Y. 1906); cf. (1912) 2 Brit. R. C. 231, at 238.
2 State v. Eastern Coal Co., 29 R. I. 254, 70 Atl. 1 (1908) (conspiracy to
fix prices).; Chicago, W. & V. Coal Co. v. Illinois, 214 Ill. 421, 73 N. E. 770
(1905) (same); Hough, J., in United States v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co.,
supra note 10, at 835 (conspiracy to violate Sherman Act; "... defendant
corporations claim that since in conspiracy evil intent is of the essence of
the crime, inherent impossibility renders the accusation futile. I think
this is but the remnant of a theory always fanciful and in process of
abandonment"); State v. Rowland Lumber Co., 153 N. C. 610, 612, 69 S. E.
(1910) (wilfully destroying buildings; "... that corporations cannot be
convicted of an offense where the intent is an ingredient is no longer tena-
ble. They are as fully liable in such cases as individuals"); United States
v. Union Supply Co., 215 U. S. 50, 30 Sup. Ct. 15 (1909), ("wilfully violat-
ing" oleomargarine law); People v. Rochester Ry. & Light Co., 195 I. Y.
102, 88 N. E. 22 (1909); United States v. Nearing, 252 Fed. 223 (S. D.
N. Y. 1918) ("wilfully obstructing" recruiting or enlistment service);
United States v. American Socialist Soc., 260 Fed. 885, 887 (S. D. N. Y.
1919) (same; contention that a corporation cannot be guilty of an "evil pur-
pose to do a wrongful act . . . successfully made in the earlier history of
the law and, indeed, until comparatively recent times, has now been fully
discarded"); American Socialist Soc. v. United States, 266 Fed. 212 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1920), certiorari denied, 254 U. S. 637, 41 Sup. Ct. 12 (1920); Tele-
gram Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, 172 Mass. 294, 297, 52 N. E. 445,
446 (1899) (criminal contempt; "There is no more difficulty in imputing to
a corporation a specific intent in criminal proceedings than in civil");
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Second, the tradition that some particular crimes or classes
of crimes cannot be committed by a corporation -12 has survived,
though in attenuated forms. A federal court said in 1898: "Of
course, there are certain crimes of which a corporation cannot
be guilty; as, for instance, bigamy, perjury, rape, murder, and
other offenses, which will readily suggest themselves to the
mind." 3 The United States Supreme Court said in 1909: "It
is true that there are some crimes, which in their nature, cannot
be committed by corporations." 14 In the same year the New
York Court of Appeals said: "Of course, it has been fully recog-
nized that there are many crimes so involving personal, malicious
intent and acts ultra vires that a corporation manifestly could
not commit them." 25 While the statements just quoted, and
most similar statements, are dicta, there are decisions to the
effect that a corporation cannot be guilty of homicide.' There
are, on the other hand, modern decisions that a corporation may
be convicted of unlawfully causing a death,17 or manslaughter, 13
or larceny. 9
Third, it has often been asserted that a corporation cannot be
guilty of a crime which is ultra vires; 2 but the contrary has
been held.2 '
People v. Star Co., 135 App. Div. 517, 120 N. Y. Supp. 493 (1st Dept. 1909)
(criminal libel) ; Joplin Mercantile Co. v. United States, 213 Fcd. 92G (C. C.
A. 8th, 1914) (conspiracy to introduce liquor into the Indian country) ; State
v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 90 N. J. L. 372, 103 AtI. 6S5 (1917); 92 N. J. L.
261, 106 Atl. 23 (1919) (manslaughter), affd 94 N. J. L. 171, 111 Atl. 257
(1920); People v. Tyson & Co., 50 N. Y. L. J. 1829 (N. Y. City Magis-
trate's Ct. 1914) (larceny).
'12In 1854 the Massachusetts court declared that a corporation could not
be guilty of "treason or felony; of perjury or offenses against the perzon?'
Commonwealth v. New Bedford Bridge, supra note 8, at 345. Subztantially
the same language had been used by the Court of Queen's Bnch in 1840.
Queen v. G. N. of Eng. Ry., 9 Q. B. 315 (184G).
13 United States v. John Kelso Co., supra note 7, at 300.
24 New York Central R. R. v. United States, 212 U. S. 481, 494, 29 Sup.
Ct. 304, 307 (1909).
IS People v. Rochester Ry. & Light Co., su.pra note 11, at 105, 88 N. E.
at 23.
16 Commonwealth v. Illinois Central R. R., 152 Ky. 320, 153 S. W. 459
(1913) (manslaughter); Regina v. Gt. West. Laundry Co., aupra note 9
(manslaughter); Commonwealth v. Punxsutawney St. Ry., czpra note 9
(manslaughter); People v. Rochester Ry. & Light Co., supra note 11 (man-
slaughter). The last decision turned on a statutory definition of the crime,
and the court's argument is favorable to the view that, xvith no narrow
definition in the way, a corporation might commit manslaughter.
17Union Colliery Co. v. Queen, 31 Can. Sup. Ct. 81 (1900) (statutory).
1Ls State v. Lehigh Valley R. R., supra note 11.
19 People v. Tyson & Co., Inc., supra note 11.
-OUnited States v. Alaska Packers Ass'n, 1 Alas-a, 217 (1901); 1 Mc-
CLAmn, CRinmAL LAW (1897) § 184; 1 BisOP, CanmIAL LAw (9th cd.
1923) § § 417, 418, 422.
21 Louisville Ry. v. Commonwealth, 130 Ky. 738, 114 S. W. 343 (1908);
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Some cases, chiefly early ones, hold that corporations are not
within the meaning of general words like "any person," "who-
ever," etc., in criminal statutes.2 2  The rule has survived into
modern times in a few states; 23 but it is now very generally
held that such words include corporations, and that criminal
statutes employing such words are accordingly applicable to
corporations unless a contrary intent appears.24  Sometimes
general construction statutes aid in reaching this conclusion. 2
If, as in the case of "felonies," the only punishment available
for a given crime is one which cannot be inflicted upon a cor-
poration-specifically, death or imprisonment-it is generally
laid down that the corporation cannot be convicted or indicted.',
But it appears that the corporation may commit the crime; for
an individual may be convicted of aiding and abetting the cor-
poration to commit it, or conspiring with the corporation to
commit'it, though there is no way of punishing the corporation. "
And the corporation itself may be convicted of a crime for
which the punishment provided is fine or imprisonment, 28 or
even fine and imprisonment,29 though it is evidently impossible
to enforce the provision for imprisonment. The whole difficulty
may be readily removed by a statute which makes it clear
Union Colliery Co. v. Queen, supra note 17; cf. the dictum in Nat'l Bank
v. Graham, 100 U. S. 699, 702 (1879): "Corporations are liable for every
wrong they commit, and in such cases the doctrine of ultra vires has no ap-
plication."
22 State v. Cincinnati Fertilizer Co., 24 Ohio St. 611 (1874).
23 State v. Terre Haute Brewing Co., 186 Ind. 248, 115 N. E. 772 (1917),;
Judge Lynch Book Co. v. State, 84 Tex. Ci. App. 459, 208 S. W. 526 (1919).
24 United States v. Union Supply Co., supra note 11; United States V.
American Socialist Soc., supra note 11, at 887; United States v. John Kelso
Co., supra note 7; United States v. N. Y. Herald Co., 159 Fed. 296 (S. D.
N. Y. 1907); State v. Creamery Co., 83 Kan. 389, 111 Pac. 474 (1910);
United States v. Alaska Packers Ass'n, supra note 20; United States v.
Ames Co., 2 Alaska, 74 (1903); Overland Cotton Mill Co. v. People, 32 Colo.
263, 75 Pac. 924 (1904); State v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 15 W. Va. 362
(1879).
25 U. S. Rev. Stat. (2d ed. 1878) § 1: " . . .the word 'person' may ex-
tend and be applied to partnerships and corporations." English Interpre-
tation Act (1889) 52 & 53 Vict. c. 63, § 2 (1) : "In the construction of every
enactment relating to an offense ... whether contained in an Act passed
before or after the commencement of this Act, the expression 'person' shall,
unless the contrary intention appears, include a body corporate."
26 State v. Truax, 130 Wash. 69, 226 Pac. 259 (1924).
27 United States v. Van Schaick, 134 Fed. 592, 602 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
1904); Cohen v. United States, 157 Fed. 651, 653 (C. C. A. 2d, 1907).
28 Southern Ry. v. State, 125 Ga. 287, 54 S. E. 160 (1906); (1924) 33
A. L. R. 1211, n.
29 United States v. Union Supply Co., supra note 11; Commonwealth v.
Pulaski Co. Agr'l Ass'n, 92 Ky. 197, 17 S. W. 442 (1891).
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that, whatever the crime, -when the defendant is a corporation a
fine may be imposed.3'
The question in what relation the human criminals must stand
to the corporation in order that their crime shall be its crime
has received little attention. The question is often altogether
ignored in cases in which it would seem to be directly involved.
A conspicuous example of this tendency is Grant Bros. Con-
struction Co. v. United States, - in which a jury, instructed to
decide whether "the company" knew that the statute was being
violated, apparently received very little light from the court
upon the question whose knowledge would be "the company's"
knowledge for this purpose. It is clearly not necessary that
either stockholders or directors in meeting authorize or approve
the criminal act; if this were required, there would be few cor-
porate crimes, as the desired result can always be brought about
without formal action. Informal authority, as by silent ac-
quiescence in similar crimes, is clearly enough.zi Few courts, if
any, have thought it necessary that the stockholders be in any
way involved. It is sometimes assumed that the directors must
be.,  Sometimes it is assumed that either the stockholders or
the directors must be.33 It has been suggested that in regard
to crimes in which a "criminal mind" is essential, the corpora-
tion should be identified with its "governing officers." - But in
many cases the action of an agent or servant of the company,
30 N. Y. Penal Law (Cahill, 1923) § 1932, provides that "In all cases
-where a corporation is convicted of an offense for the commission of which
a natural person -would be punishable with imprisonment, as for a felony,
such corporation is punishable by a fine of not more than five thousand
dollars."31 E. g., State v. Workers' Socialist Pub. Co., 150 Minn. 40G, 185 N. W.
931 (1921); Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Charlottesville, 12G Va. 800, 101
S. E. 357 (1919).
32 13 Ariz. 388, 114 Pac. 955 (1911).
33 Cf. State v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., supra note 24.
31- ...the intention of its directors that the prohibited act should be
done is imputed to the corporation itself.' United States v. John Kelso Co.,
supra note 7, at 306.
In imposing criminal responsibility the law should look "rather to the
corporation at -whose instance and for whose benefit the wrong is perpe-
trated, than to the individual directors by whose order the wrong was
done." State v. Morris R. R., supra note 5, at 309.
35 In American Socialist Soc. v. United States, smpra note 11, at 214,
the jury was charged not to convict the corporation unless they found that
the men -who acted "were authorized by the board of directors or the mem-
bership of the corporation to obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service."
In People v. Sheffield Farms Co., 225 N. Y. 25, 121 N. E. 474 (1018) and
State v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., supra note 24, it is not clear whether parti-
cipation of the directors, or of the directors or stockholders in the alterna-
tive, is required.
36 Notes (1914) 27 HARV. L. REV. 589.
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in the course of his employment, is treated as making the cor-
poration guilty37
The statement of the Attorney General of Rhode Island in
1908,38 that "The tendency of the present time is to hold cor-
porations responsible, criminally as well as civilly, for all acts
committed by their agents, having any relation to the business
of the corporation" (i.e., to that part of its business which is
entrusted to those agents) is clearly true today.
REASONS FOR RESPONSIBILITY
The reasons for imposing upon corporations criminal responsi-
bility for their agents' acts are the same reasons which justify
treating the same acts as criminal in the individual actors.
Whatever social purpose (if any) tends to be served by punish-
ing or threatening to punish the individual who does a given
act, tends also to be served by punishing or threatening to pun-
ish the corporation in the course of whose business he does it.
The argument against corporate criminal responsibility, that the
corporation cannot itself be "guilty" and therefore -should not
be punished, rests on the tacit assumption that the aim of crimi-
nal law is retributive or retaliative, which is to say vindictive or
vengeful; consists, in other words, in the pleasure which some
persons derive from the infliction of pain upon those whom
they conceive to deserve it. Corporate irresponsibility is a sur-
vival from a time when that was more broadly and clearly true
than it is today. No doubt most of us occasionally experience
this sadistic sort of impulse, and no doubt it still underlies much
of our criminal law. It is gratified in many instances rather
37 Overland Cotton Mill Co. v. People, 32 Colo. 263, 75 Pac. 924 (1904)
(employing child labor; the agent had been forbidden to commit the crime).
Ace.: State v. Louisville & N. R. R., 91 Tenn. 445, 19 S. W. 229 (1892)
(obstructing highway). [Contra: as to effect of violation of orders, John
Gund Brewery Co. v. United States, 204 Fed. 17 (C. C. A. 8th, 1913) (sell-
ing liquor)]. Southern Express Co. v. State, 1 Ga. App. 700, 58 S. E. 67
(1907) (delivering liquor); Standard Oil Co. v. State, 117 Tenn. 618, 100 S.
W. 705 (1907) (anti-trust law); New York Central R. R. v. United States,
supra note 14 (Elkins Act-clear intent of statute); People v. Star Co.,
'supra note 11 (criminal libel); Telegram Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth,
supra note 11 (criminal contempt); State v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 162
Mo. 1, 52 S. W. 595 (1899) (anti-trust law); People v. Rochester Ry.
Light Co., supra note 15.
Cf. United States v. N. Y. Herald Co., supra note 24 (knowingly mailing
unmailable matter); State v. Workers' Socialist Pub. Co., supra note 31
(publishing forbidden doctrine) ; Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Charlottes-
ville, supra note 31 (doing business without license).
These cases cannot be explained away on the ground, suggested in State
v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., supra note 24, at 387, that the criminal act of
the agent was one "which from its nature must have been approved by the
corporation, such as the erection of a depot in a public road."
38 State v. Eastern Coal Co., supra note 11, at 267, 70 Atl. at 7.
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by the punishment of the individual criminal than of the cor-
poration for which he acts.
But we are coming to accept the idea that the infliction of
harm is not in itself a good; that the only decent purpose of
criminal law, as of any law, is to accomplish something useful
to man. As the gratification of the primitive capacity for de-
light in suffering cultivates a tendency to inflict it, enjoyment by
others of the criminal's pain is not an unmixed benefit to man;
and it appears to be the only benefit which can commonly re-
sult from imposing criminal penalties upon an individual, and
cannot commonly result from imposing them also upon the cor-
poration for which he acts. As the criminal responsibility of
corporations, when it exists, is not exclusive or alternative, but
cumulative, with the responsibility of the individual crininalsf
there is no competition between the two responsibilities and the
question which is commonly the more effective in preventing
corporate business from being conducted in criminal ways is un-
important. The chief civilized purpose of criminal law is de-
terrence-the prevention of acts which are conceived to injure
one social interest or another. The question is not whose mind
is "guilty," but whose responsibility will serve this deterrent
purpose (without disproportionate sacrifice of other social in-
terests).
It seems evident that this purpose is further served if cor-
porate criminal responsibility is added to the criminal responsi-
bility of the corporation's representatives. If the corporation
itself is immune, it often stands to gain rather than to lose by the
commission of crime in its business, and directors, stockholders
and agents, from loyalty to it or in the hope of bettering their
own position in it or tliough it, may take a chance of personal
responsibility for the sake of corporate advantage. On the
other hand, if the proposed crime involves a prospect of loss, by
fine, to the corporation, and consequent injury to the actor's
position with it or investment in it, this prospect added to the
chance of personal responsibility may deter him. In sustaining
the conviction of a railroad corporation for rebating, the Su-
preme Court has said:
"It is a part of the public history of the times that statutes
against rebates could not be effectually enforced so long as in-
dividuals only were subject to punishment for violation of the
law, when the giving of rebates or concessions enured to the
benefit of the corporations of which the individuals were but the
instruments. This situation, developed in more than one report
of the Interstate Commerce Commission, was no doubt influen-
39New York Central R. R. v. United States, supa note 14; United States
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co. supra note 10; Crall & Ostrander v. Comm.,
103 Va. 855, 49 S. E. 683 (1905).
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tial in bringing about the enactment of the Elkins Law, making
corporations criminally liable." 40
It may be suggested with force that people object quite as
strongly to direct as to indirect injury to themselves, and quite
as strongly to deprivation of life or liberty as to the economic
loss which is all that can reach them through the punishment of
a corporation. But, in many cases, economic loss is all that can
fall upon the individual actor, though he be prosecuted personal-
ly, since the only punishment provided for great numbers of
offenses is a fine; and with a little zeal on the part of prosecut-
ing officers, the likelihood of the theoretically available punish-
ment (if any) being actually inflicted may be made so much
greater in the case of the corporation as to constitute not only
an appreciable and additional deterrent, but in many instances
a stronger one than the direct penalty to which the individual
is exposed.
There are several reasons for this potentially greater likeli-
hood. In the first place, it may on occasion, be clear enough
that some individuals have committed a crime for corporate
purposes, and yet not clear who those individuals are. It is
moreover relatively difficult to apprehend and prosecute a num-
ber, particularly a large number, of individuals, even if their
identity is known; the corporation is always readily available.
And the individuals may be financially so irresponsible as to
have nothing to fear from a fine,41 while the assets of the cor-
poration may be abundant. Finally, juries-as has long been
notorious in civil cases-are not so reluctant to find corporations
guilty as to find individuals guilty. The Nearing case 42 illus-
trates this in the criminal field. Scott Nearing and the Ameri-
can Socialist Society were jointly indicted for wilfully obstruct-
ing the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States.
The alleged means of obstruction was the publication of a book
or pamphlet called "The Great Madness." The jury was in-
structed to acquit the corporation unless it found that the
individuals who acted were authorized by the board of directors
or by the membership of the corporation to obstruct the re-
cruiting or enlistment service. There was no direct evidence
that the members of the corporation, or its board of directors,
40 New York Central R. R. v. United States, supra note 14, at 495, 29 Sup.
Ct. at 307. The Elkins Act provides: " . . . the act, omission, or failure of
any officer, agent, or other person acting for or employed by any common
carrier ... shall in every case be also deemed to be the act, omission, or
failure of such carrier as well as that of the person." 32 Stat. 847, (1903)
U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 8597 (2).
41 Apart from the risk, in some jurisdictions, of commitment in default of
payments. See 16 C. J. 1367.
42 United States v. Nearing, supra note 11; United States v. American
Socialist Soc., supra note 11.
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or even its publication committee, authorized the publication.
The only evidence against the corporation seems to have been
that certain of its officers authorized the publication, that Near-
ing was paid with corporate funds, and that it was reported at a
corporate meeting that two pamphlets by Nearing had been pub-
lished. On the other hand, it was not disputed that the book
was written by Nearing. Yet the jury "acquitted Nearing and
convicted the corporation; and this result was sustained on ap-
peal. As the district court observed:
"In indictments for crime, where human beings are jointly
tried with corporations, the human interest naturally centers
around the living individual. During a trial the corporation is
a sort of abstraction, and seems rather a secondary figure. The
human being may lose his liberty if convicted, while the worst
that can happen to the corporation is the imposition of a fine.
When, therefore, the jury rendered its verdict, the first impres-
sion was one of inconsistency and compromise." 3
Corporate criminal responsibility tends to prevent crime not
only by influencing the corporation's representatives of all de-
grees to abstain from conducting its business in unlawful ways,
but also by influencing those of higher or more remote degree to
restrain subordinates. Stockholders who know nothing about
the business of a corporation incur no personal responsibility if
it is in fact conducted in a criminal way. A stockholder may
examine the corporation's books; a stockholder may restrain
the corporation by injunction, if necessary, from doing a crimi-
nal act; but as criminal acts, which impose no responsibility
upon him, may be very profitable to it, the law offers him little
inducement-if the corporation also is immune-to prevent
crime by the exercise of his powers of investigation and re-
straint. So far as it makes the corporation criminally responsi-
ble, the law supplies the stockholder with a strong motive for
seeing that its business is lawfully conducted. Similarly, di-
rectors, managers and superior agents are necessarily more in-
clined to encourage or ignore criminality on the part of their
subordinates, when the subordinates alone are subject to pun-
ishment, than when their crimes involve a risk of injury to the
corporation, and through it to the directors and managers them-
selves.
Why should a distinction be made between the criminal and
the civil responsibility of a corporation for the acts of its agents?
The simple and orderly course would seem to be to make no dis-
tinction; the burden of proof may be said to rest, logically, upon
the proponents of a distinction, though we are so accustomed to
the idea of some distinction that the proposal to complete its
43 United States v. Nearing, supra note 11, at 888.
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abolition carries the practical burden which always rests upon
the proponents of change. What differences are there between
crimes and torts which require or justify a narrower corporate
responsibility for crimes than for torts? It is said that crimes
are injuries to the state, the public, or society, while torts are
injuries to individuals. But many crimes are torts and many
torts crimes. Nothing 'can injure society, or the public, without
injuring a greater or less number and proportion of individuals.
The same thing is true of the "state"; which means either the
government or the society that is governed. Since governments
consist of human beings and exist to serve human purposes, an
injury to the government is an injury to the individuals by or
for whom it is conducted. It is true, of course, that an act may
injure the government, in the sense of the minority by or for
whom it is conducted, and yet be harmless or beneficial to society,
in the sense of the majority; but this does not militate against
the proposition that it is impossible to injure either society or
the government without injuring individuals. Conversely, an
injury to individuals is not often made a tort unless it is felt
to have a tendency to injure society. Not only murder, rape and
arson, but restraint of trade and the sale of adulterated milk,
injure society because they injure individuals; and exactly the
same is true of personal injuries, deceit, defamation, malicious
prosecution and unfair trade. The supposed difference in nature
between crimes and torts is a difference in emphasis or point of
view on the one hand, and in procedure on the other.44  But
even if it were true that crimes injure only society and torts
only individuals, would it follow, or even tend to follow, that
the criminal responsibility of corporations should be narrower
than their civil responsibility? Do the interests of society de-
serve less protection than the interests of individuals?
THE INNOCENT STOCKHOLDER
It is true, of course, that the influence which a small stock-
holder in a large corporation is capable of exerting is commonly
infinitesimal. It is also true that in many and perhaps most
instances, crimes, the commission of which cannot be prevented
by the prospect of personal responsibility, will not be prevented
by the prospect of corporate responsibility. But corporate re-
44,, ... the real distinction between a tort and a crime is to be sought
for, not in a difference between their tendencies, but in the difference be-
tween the methods by which the remedy for the wrong is pursued." 16 C. J.
55. "An offense which is pursued at the discretion of the injured party or
his representative is a Civil Injury. An offense which is pursued by the
Sovereign or by the subordinates of the Sovereign, is a Crime." 1 AUSTIN,
JURISPRUDENCE (3d ed. 1869) Lect. 17, quoted in 16 C. J. 55 from 1 CooLEY,
ToRTs (3d ed. 1906) *96.
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sponsibility inevitably tends to supply an additional deterrent,
and this additional deterrent cannot fail to be effective in a sub-
stantial number of instances. It should accordingly be imposed
unless its imposition will do harm as serious as the good which
it is clearly capable of accomplishing. The only serious harm
which it can do, consists in the injury to those really innocent
stockholders who have nothing to do with the crime and no real
opportunity of preventing it. This injury is regrettable; but it
is the same sort of injury which results to the same innocent
stockholders from imposing tort, or contract, or workmen's com-
pensation responsibility on the corporation. Equally in the crim-
inal case and in the other cases, the balance of advantage seems
to require subordinating their interest to the general interest.
However "innocent" the owners of the corporate enterprise may
be, the general interest requires that the burden of torts 4 and
industrial accidents should fall upon them rather than upon the
casual victim, and it requires, similarly, that corporate repre-
sentatives be deterred, so far as corporate responsibility can de-
ter them, from conducting the business in criminal ways. It is
true that the conspicuous social interest involved is not identical
in the two cases; that it consists in compensation in the one case,
and prevention in the other; but the social interest in prevention
is quite as great as the social interest in compensation, and
therefore quite as capable of outweighing the private interest
of individual stockholders. MNoreover, the difference betveen
the social interests involved in the two cases is hardly so marked
as the traditional way of looking at them assumes; for tort re-
sponsibility serves at least a secondary purpose of deterrence,
and it is arguable that criminal responsibility in the form of a
fine may often serve a secondary purpose of compensation.4
45 An exception was once made of intentional torts. Orr v. Bank of
United States, 1 Ohio, 36 (1822); Vanderbilt v. Richmond Co., 2 N. Y. 479
(1849); Eastern Counties Ry. v. Broom, 6 Ex. 314 (Ex. Ch. 1851). But
the responsibility of employers was long ago extended to them, regardlezs
of their being or not being also crimes. Fifth Ave. Bank v. Forty-Second
St. Co., 137 N. Y. 231, 33 N. E. 378 (1S93) (forgery); Hamlyn v. Houston
& Co. [1903] 1 K. B. 81 (bribery by agent of partnership); Nat'l Ban]: v.
Graham, supra note 21, at 702. And "the liability of the employer for the
deliberate acts of his servant seems to have been introduced in the special
case of corporations. All the earlier reported cases ... are cases of ...
companies." BATY, VIcARIous Llmnrry (1916) 85. It has even been clear
for some time that corporations may be responsible for exemplary or puni-
tive damages on account of the torts of their servants. 2 MoUmAvrz, PnuvAx-z
CoRPORATIoNs (2d ed. 1886) § 729.
46 .e, not vengeance, but economic reparation to society for the injury
which the crime is conceived to have inflicted upon it. As the New York
Court of Appeals has put it, " . . . the duty to make reparation to
the state for the wrongs of one's servants when the reparation does not
go beyond the payment of a moderate fine, is a reasonable regulation of
the right to do business by proxy." People v. Sheffield Farms Co., mipra
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It is sometimes assumed that a crime cannot be a corporate
act unless it is authorized or ratified by the directors or the
stockholders. A minor objection to this view is that such action,
even if it has occurred, may be very difficult to prove; it is not
likely to be set out in the minutes41 But it might as well be
argued that, as neither directors nor stockholders can legally au-
thorize the commission of a crime, a crime can never be a cor-
porate act; which is as much as to say that all crime, corporate
and non-corporate, is impossible, since no one can commit crime
legally. The machinery for the commission of corporate crime,
as of any crime, is necessarily extra-legal. If A has entered
into an intra vires contract in the name of a corporation, the
directors could lawfully authorize him to do so, and the question
of its responsibility is the question of his authorization. But
if A has committed either a crime or a tort in the course of the
corporation's business, no one could lawfully authorize him to
do so, and the question of the corporation's responsibility is the
broad question of policy; will the general interest be served, on
the whole, by imposing it? Analogies based upon the machinery
by which legal acts may be legally authorized are scarcely ma-
terial. If A has committed a tort in the course of the corpora-
tion's business, there is clearly no necessity that directors or
stockholders shall have authorized the commission of the par-
ticular tort, or of a class of torts to which it belongs, or of torts
in general, in order to make the corporation responsible; an au-
thority to A to do a part of the corporation's work incidentally
to which the tort was done, is enough to make it responsible. If
in the doing of the same work A commits a crime, his want of
authorization is no greater and the reasons of policy for holding
the corporation are no less. In the language of the United
States Supreme Court, "We see no valid objection in law, and
every reason in public policy, why the corporation, which profits
by the transaction, and can only act through its agents and offi-
note 35, at 32, 121 N. E. at 477. The conduct of enterprises leads occa-
sionally to crimes as inevitably, though not so frequently, as to torts or
industrial accidents. Some of the resulting social burden may well be im-
posed upon the concern, and so ultimately upon the individuals, who carry
on and profit from the business. The business which has injured society
may well confer a benefit upon society through the payment of a fine.
The i5isk of loss may appropriately fall where the chance of profit lies.
That the notion of economic reparation for crime is unconventional is not
all that can be said against it; such reparation may be inadequate and is
necessarily inaccurate. But this is equally true of compensation to in-
dividuals for many torts, such as defamation or personal injuries. It
does not follow that it is not worth while for the law to attempt compen-
sation.
47Cf. Limpus v. Gen. Omnibus Co., 1 H. & C. 526 (Ex. Ch. 1862); State
v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., supra note 24.
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cers, shall be held punishable by -fine because of the knowledge
and intent of its agents. . ." 8
If the business in which the crime is committed is ultra vires,
it is reasonable to hold that neither the business nor anything in
furtherance of it is done by the corporation unless the stock-
holders have authorized or acquiesced in the business; but if they
have, its ultra vires character furnishes no logical reason for
relieving the corporation from responsibility for the crime. Its
ultra vires character then means no more than that the corpora-
tion was not authorized by the state to commit the crime; but,
obviously, no one is authorized by the state to commit any crime.
The courts have had to abandon at various points the old notion
that ultra vires action is impossible. Ultra vires torts and ultra
vires transfers of property create rights and liabilities. There
is no reason for a distinction in this respect between torts and
crimes.
The consequences of criminal responsibility, in the case of a
corporation, are neither different in kind from the consequences
of civil responsibility, nor necessarily greater in degree. The
contrary notion results from confusing the corporation's situa-
tion with that of an individual. In the case of an individual,
while tort responsibility commonly involves no burden but an
economic one, many sorts of criminal responsibility may involve
his liberty, and some may involve his life. Even if the sentence
is a fine, he may in many jurisdictions be committed until it is
paid.49 Furthermore, he is more likely to suffer opprobrium
from a criminal prosecution than from a civil one; and in the
case of some crimes, the odium which results from conviction, or
even prosecution, is great. These may be good reasons for re-
fusing to make the individual's criminal responsibility for his
agents' acts as broad as his civil responsibility. But such dis-
tinctions are nearly or quite irrelevant when the defendant is a
corporation. A corporation's conviction of crime, no matter
what crime, can neither hang any one nor deprive any one of a
day's liberty. Neither can it, normally, injure any one's repu-
tation; certainly it can seldom affect the reputations of those
persons connected with the corporation who are unconnected
with the crime. The consequences of a corporation's criminal
responsibility as of its civil responsibility are purely economic.
This is true even if the corporation, in addition to being fined,
is deprived of its charter, or suffers a loss of popularity and
patronage. To the really innocent stockholder it is quite imma-
terial whether his corporation is found guilty of a crime, a tort,
4s New York Central R. R. v. United States, szepra note 14, at 495, 29
Sup. Ct. at 307.
1- See 16 C. J. 1367.
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or a breach of contract; in each case he stands to suffer a money
loss, and a money loss only.
CORPORATE "GUILT"
It is said that crime involves guilt, that guilt is personal, and
that there should therefore be no vicarious criminal responsibili-
ty; that a corporation cannot itself have a "guilty mind," and
should not be criminally responsible for the conduct of others,
whatever their relation to it. This argument involves a num-
ber of very doubtful premises, besides the premise that the
purpose of criminal law is the vindictive one of punishing the
"guilty." It assumes, in the first place, that the corporation's
representatives are "others" than the corporation as clearly
and completely as a human principal and his agent are distinct
beings. Without undertaking to contribute to the debate over
the real or fictitious character of the corporate entity, it may
be suggested that this assumption is not wholly true on the
basis of either the reality theory or the fiction theory. So far
as the separate corporate entity is a fiction, and the corporation
is in fact nothing but its stockholders, it follows at once that
the acts and thoughts of the directors and agents are not strictly
those of the corporation, but also that the acts and thoughts of
the stockholders (which relate to its business) are strictly those
of the corporation. On the other hand, so far as the separate
entity is a reality, it would seem to follow that what stockhold-
ers, directors, officers, agents, or servants of the corporation do,
in the course of their employment, is actually done by it. A
human being may speak words or make motions himself, or he
may employ an agent who does so for his purposes; there is,
then, a clear distinction of fact between his action and his
agent's. But a corporation, if it is an entity distinct from its
stockholders, can neither move nor speak except in and by en-
tities other than itself; and there is, therefore, no distinction
at all between its speech or motion and that of its representa-
tives in the course of its business. Though qui facit per aliumfacit
per se, as applied to a human principal, is a pure fiction, it does
not follow that it is fictitious to say that the acts of corporate
representatives are the acts of the corporation. The alterna-
tive, if the corporation is a reality, is to say that it exists but
cannot act; and if it is admitted to exist, it is hard to imagine
a reason for denying that it can act.
The tradition that the physical movements of a corporation's
representatives may, but their mental states may not, be at-
tributed to it for criminal purposes,50 seems as inept as it is per-
50" ,,public policy certainly does not demand that a person or
association should be punished by the State, through criminal proceedings,
on account of a wrong committed by another. This would be contrary to
CORPORATE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
sistent. There is no occasion for such a distinction between the
various parts of the human animal; if what his hands do may
properly be attributed to the corporation for which he acts, what
his brains do may be attributed to it with equal propriety. 51
This obsolescent distinction is parallel to the obsolete one to the
effect that a corporation, having no mouth to speak with, could
not contract orally, but only by deed. The law came to recognize
that corporations are as well (or ill) equipped with mouths as
with hands; it is coming to recognize that they are as well
equipped with brains as with either. In the same sense and to
the same extent that they can talk and strike, they can desire
and plan.
It is sometimes assumed that there are limits of some less
definite sort to vicarious action, and that this precludes the com-
mission of some crimes, like murder, bigamy, rape - and per-
jury, by corporations. Why murder is commonly included in
this category is not apparent, as it is notorious that a human
being may commit murder without himself handling the weapon.
Moreover, any distinction between acts which can, and acts
which cannot, be done vicariously is illogical; logically, every-
thing or nothing can be done vicariously. A may fire the gun
which kills X, and A may swear falsely. B may be emotionally,
physically and geographically incapable of firing the gun; but
if he procures A to fire it (to kill X), B is guilty of murder. If
B procures A to swear falsely, there is no good reason why B
should not be deemed guilty of perjury. There is no logic, there
is only habit, in saying that B strikes the blow which A strikes
at his instigation, but that he does not take and violate the oath
which A takes and violates at his instigation. The proposition
about the blow is true only in a figurative sense, and in the fur-
ther sense that it is useful to hold B responsible for A's blow.
The figure and the responsibility would be just as appropriate
the natural sense of justice. Hence it is held that where the commission
of a crime involves the intention of the offender, this intention cannot be
imputed by means of a fiction; actual intention is required.
"It follows, therefore, that a corporation cannot be charged criminally
with a crime involving malice, or the intention of the offender. Even
though the corporators themselves should unanimously join, with malice
aforethought, in committing a crime as a corporate act, yet the malice
would be that of the several members of the company, and not actually
one malicious intention of the whole." 2 Momwnrz, op. cit. upra note 45,
at § 732. But where "the crime consists of the act alone, without regard
to the intention with which it was committed . . . there is no difficulty
in attributing an offense of this character to a corporation, since it may
be committed entirely through the company's agents." Ibid. § 733.
t . corporations are not properly indictable for crimes involv-
ing a criminal state of mind." Canfield, op. cit. supra note 1, at 480.
51 Cf. supra note 11.
52 The courts have held that rape is not too personal to be committed
vicariously, and that it may accordingly be so committed by persons who
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in the case of the oath. If it has not been customary to call B's
offense perjury, but subornation of perjury, this is an accident
which has no basis in the nature of things. While corporations
are not apt to commit rape, there is no inherent difficulty about
it. So the practice of law is felt to be so personal that corpora-
tions should not engage in it; 53 yet the possibility of their doing
so is necessarily recognized by the very statutes and decisions
which condemn it. It is submitted that there is no crime which
corporations should be regarded as incapable of committing,
unless one created by a statute which is clearly aimed at human
beings only.
Moreover, the assumption that crime involves "guilt" is quite
erroneous. The proposition "guilt is personal," and the argu-
ment against vicarious responsibility which is based upon it,
evidently contemplate "guilt" in some moral sense; but the pres-
ence or absence of guilt in any such sense is generally or always
immaterial to the question of an individual's criminal responsi-
bility. It is familiar that great numbers of statutory crimes
involve no mental element more evil than the intent to do the act
which the statute prohibits; and ignorance of the prohibition is,
of course, no defense. It is also true, if somewhat less familiar,
that the actor may be responsible though he did not know, and
had no means of knowing, that the act he committed and the
act which the statute prohibited were in fact the same.51 Thus,
a man may be guilty of adultery though he does not know that
the woman with whom he has intercourse is married; " of sell-
ing 51 or transporting5 7 intoxicating liquor, though he does not
know that the liquor is intoxicating; of knowingly depositing ob-
scene matter in the mails, though in his opinion the matter he
deposits is not obscene.53 Courts have even permitted entirely
"guiltless" human principals or superiors to be convicted of var-
cannot commit it directly, including the victim's husband (Audley's Case,
3 How. St. Tr. 401 (1631); Re Kantrowitz, 24 Calif. App. 203, 140 Pac.
1078 (1924); the cases are collected in (1922) 18 A. L. R. 1064 n.); or a
woman (State v. Jones, 83 N. C. 605 (1880); the cases are collected in a
note in (1920) 5 A. L. R. 782: "Criminal responsibility of one cooperating
in offense which he is incapable of committing personally"). Impotenco
is no defense to a charge of aiding another to commit rape. Law v. Com-
monwealth, 75 Va. 885 (1881).
-' Matter of Co-op. Law Co., 198 N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. 15 (1910).
54Brown v. State, 7 Pen. 159, 74 Atl. 836 (Del. 1909) (harboring a
female under 18 for sexual intercourse; reasonable belief that she was over
18 no defense); Commonwealth v. Smith, 166 Mass. 370, 44 N. E. 503
(1896) (being present where gambling implements are found; indictments
need not charge defendant knew of the presence of the implements).
55Commonwealth v. Elwell, 2 Metc. 190 (Mass. 1840).
56 Commonwealth v. Hallett, 103 Mass. 452 (1869).
57 Commonwealth v. Mixer, 207 Mass. 141, 93 N. E. 249 (1910).58 Rosen v. United States, 161 U. S. 29, 41, 16 Sup. Ct. 434, 438 (1896).
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ous statutory crimes,"9 and some common-law crimes.c9 But it is
said that, while most statutory crimes and some common-law
crimes may properly be attributed to a corporation, because they
involve no "guilty mind," most common-law and some statutory
crimes involve a guilty mind or "mens rea." This is true only in
a technical or figurative sense. These familiar words undoubt-
edly have a strong moral connotation, but it is a connotation at
variance with the facts. There is probably no crime which has
as one of its necessary elements either hate, or envy, or ill-wfl, or
selfishness, or sense of wrong-doing, or contempt for law, or any
generally harmful or generally reprobated ("immoral") mental
characteristic. The so-called "guilty mind" of criminal law
means only those highly various particular mental states which
are constituent elements in various particular crimes.c6 No
59 Bond v. Evans, L. R. 21 Q. B. D. 249 (13S) (suffering gaming to be
carried on); State v. Gilmore, 80 Vt. 514, 68 Atl. 65S (1903) (selling
liquor to minor; defendant had forbidden such sale); State v. W orhers'
Socialist Pub. Co., supra note 31, at 411, 185 N. W. at 933 (editing, iosuing
or knowingly circulating certain doctrine; defendant, the managing editor
of a paper, "exercised no supervision over the page on which the article
in question appeared, and . . . did not see it until after it was pub-
lished"). Contra: People v. Parks, 49 BIich. 333, 13 N. W. 613 (13S2)
(sale of liquor to drunkard); Kearley v. Tonge, 60 L. J. Q. B. 159 (1891)
(sale of adulterated food) .
60 Rex v. Gutch, 1 Mlood. & M. 433 (Nisi Prius 1329) involved an indict-
ment of individuals, the proprietors of a newspaper, for a libel published
in the paper. There was no evidence that the men knew anything about
the libel Lord Tenterden, C. J., charging the jury, at 437: "a proprietor
of a newspaper who is not shown to take, or who can show that he tooll:
no part in the publication of the newspaper, and of the libel in question,"
is criminally responsible. "But it is said that this is a different
principle from that which prevails in all other criminal casces; but this
does not appear to me to be so; the rule seems to me to be conformable to
principle, and to common sense; surely a person who derives profit from,
and who furnishes means for carrying on the concern, and entrust the
conduct of the publication to one whom he selects, and in whom he con-
fides, may be said to cause to be published what actually appoar , and
ought to be answerable, although you cannot show that he vas individually
concerned in the particular publication. It would be exceddingly dangerous
to hold otherwise, for then an irresponsible person might be put forward,
and the person really producing the publication and without whom it could
not be published, might remain behind and escape altogether."
See also Queen v. Stephens, L. R. 1 Q. B. 702 (1866) (public nuisance,
committed by defendant's workmen contrary to his orders, but in apparent
scope of employment).
62 Speaking of the phrase "non est reus, nisi mens sit rca," Sir James
Stephen, J., said, in Queen v. Tolson, 23 Q. B. D. 163, 135, 186 (1839):
"Though this phrase is in common use, I think it most unfortunate, and
not only likely to mislead, but actually misleading, on the following grounds.
It naturally suggests that, apart from all particular definitions of crimes,
such a thing exists as a 'mens rea,' or 'guilty mind,' which is always ex-
pressly or by implication involved in every definition. This is obviously
not the case, for the mental elements of different crimes differ widely...
YALE LAW JOURNAL
doubt "guilt" in a non-technical sense is frequently present when
crimes are committed, but any crime may be and many crimes
frequently are committed without it; it is no more necessary to
the crime that it be accompanied by such guilt than it is neces-
sary to such guilt that it be accompanied by the crime. Larceny
and murder, for example, involve various forms of "mens rea";
but if one steals at great inconvenience and risk to himself, and
in obedience to a categorical imperative, to feed a starving child,
he commits larceny, and if a physician purposely ends the suf-
fering of an incurable patient who is anxious to die, he commits
murder.
To an unlegal mind it suggests that by the law of England no act is a
crime which is done from laudable motives, in other words, that immorality
is essential to crime."
"The truth is that the maxim about 'mens rea' means no more than
that the definition of all or nearly all crimes contains not only an out-
ward and visible element, but a mental element, varying according to the
different nature of different crimes. . . . 2 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF CRIiMx-
iNAL LAW (1883) 95.
